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1. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958 [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards].  The United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Arbitration
Convention, was completed in New York on June 10, 1958, and was entered into force for the U.S. on
June 7, 1959.  In 1971, the Convention was codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).  The remaining sections of
chapter two of the Federal Arbitration Act address procedural questions pursuant to the Convention.  9
U.S.C. §§ 202-08 (2000).  For clarification, this article cites specific provisions in the Convention rather
than the statute in Part II, but retains specific cases’ statutory citations where appropriate in Parts III and
IV.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards provides for the “recognition” and
“enforcement” of non-domestic arbitral awards in commercial disputes,1 this
article will show that in order for an issue resolved through arbitration to be
granted preclusive effect in subsequent litigation in the United States, the
proponent must also satisfy the traditional requirements of collateral estoppel.
In this way, the Convention’s reach is not quite as expansive as a party might
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2. Hugo Marom Aviation Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical, Inc., No. 87 C 9273, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6877 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1991), and Hugo Marom Aviation Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical, Inc.,
No. 87 C 9273, 1992 WL 233942 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1992).
3. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States,
168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)); accord Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
expect, for the ensuing judicial analysis often involves complex questions of
law and fact while maintaining respect for the favored status of international
commercial arbitration.  The result is far from per se preclusivity.
Traditionally, the four requirements of collateral estoppel provide rich
ground for lawyers’ arguments; moreover, there is a dearth of case law
addressing issue preclusion by international arbitration.  This article endeavors
to shed light on the current process undertaken by the United States courts and
their resolution of some of these contentious issues.  Part I provides a brief
background on the preclusion doctrines’ purposes and requirements and
addresses the historically uneasy relationship between arbitration and
adjudication, to resolve the general question of whether arbitral awards can be
granted preclusive effect.  Part II takes this question into the international
arena and discusses the Convention’s scheme for recognition and
enforcement.  Part III individually analyzes the courts’ treatment of each of
the four requirements of collateral estoppel in determining the preclusivity of
domestic and foreign arbitral awards.  Part IV concludes by suggesting that an
integrated approach can follow the Convention’s mandates while upholding
the safeguards built into the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as illustrated in the
unpublished Hugo Marom cases.2  Judicial practice would thereby respect the
favored status of international commercial arbitration and the signatories’
desire to increase legal stability in today’s global economy, without depriving
the private parties of their rightful access to the courts.
I.  ARBITRATION’S HISTORICALLY UNEASY PRECLUSIVITY IN SUBSEQUENT
LITIGATION
The judicially-created doctrines of issue and claim preclusion are used by
courts to limit subsequent adjudication of the same issue or cause of action
after the party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it:  “A fundamental
precept of common-law adjudication . . . is that a ‘right, question or fact
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies . . . .’”3  The purposes behind preclusion are fairness
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4. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The terminology can be confused in both secondary sources and case law.  Traditionally, the
term “res judicata” has two meanings:  It can be used broadly—to encompass both preclusion doctrines,
as if to say “the matter was decided,” and narrowly—as the term for claim preclusion, which prevents the
parties from relitigating the same cause of action.  Id. “Collateral estoppel” has always referred to issue
preclusion.  Id.  Courts continue to use the Latin terms but attempt to clearly enunciate which definitions
they attach to them, and the Supreme Court refers to each in their more narrow meanings of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion.  Id.
9. In accordance with most federal and state courts, Pennsylvania state law follows the same
general requirements for collateral estoppel as the Second Restatement:
1) [T]he issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the one presented in the later
action;
2) [T]here must have been a final judgment on the merits;
3) [T]he party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with
the party to the prior adjudication; and
4) [T]he party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in question in the prior adjudication.
Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 1999).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 (1982); cf. Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1995) (listing four traditional collateral
estoppel requirements:
1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated;
2) the issue was actually litigated;
3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and
4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action).
In Zawierucha v. DiMatteo, the Pennsylvania court added a fifth element—the determination in the prior
case was essential to the judgment therein—and found that the arbitrator’s ruling preclusively decided the
issue of the car driver’s negligence.  Zawierucha v. DiMatteo, No. CIV.A. 00-3198, 2001 WL 1580228,
and judicial economy:  Reaching a final conclusion provides repose for the
individuals, consistency and finality for the legal system, and conservation of
judicial resources.4  “Application of both doctrines is central to the purpose
for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of
disputes within their jurisdictions,”5 yet it must not override the safeguards of
due process.
Although similar in function, the preclusion doctrines have different
requirements.  Under claim preclusion or res judicata, “a final judgment on the
merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause
of action.”6  Under issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, “once an issue is
actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that
determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of
action involving a party to the prior litigation.”7  Thus, the basic elements of
collateral estoppel8 can be summarized as 1) final and valid judgment;
2) identical issue; 3) fully and fairly litigated; and 4) privity.9  
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at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2001).  As an example of a successful assertion of offensive collateral estoppel by
a third party plaintiff based on a prior arbitration under Pennsylvania law, this case also answers the general
question of whether arbitral awards can ever be used for collateral estoppel purposes.
10. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
12. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL ., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.03[6][f] (3d ed. 2002).  See
also id. § 131.32[3][a].
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(1).
14. Id.§ 28.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.  The Third Circuit also cautions against overuse:
The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that collateral estoppel is inappropriate if facts
essential to the earlier litigated issue have changed.  Finally, in cases involving the offensive use of
collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts must take special care to ensure
that its application does not work unfairness to the party against whom estoppel is asserted.
Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
18. Brian Levine, Civil Procedure Law:  Preclusion Confusion:  A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing
the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 435 passim (1999); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial
Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623 passim (1988).
Despite some scholarly criticism10 and judicial exceptions,11 courts use
their discretion to assess the elements of both preclusion doctrines and often
find them satisfied by the prior arbitration’s proceedings.  Moore’s Federal
Practice states, “it is well-settled that the doctrine of issue preclusion is
applicable to issues resolved by an earlier arbitration.”12  The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments agrees:  “[A] valid and final award by arbitration has
the same effects under the rules of res judicata [broad definition], subject to
the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.”13  Yet even
when the elements otherwise appear to be satisfied, the Restatement advises
against collateral estoppel in some circumstances.14  Where the prior
proceeding was an arbitration, a court may find “[a] new determination of the
issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation
of jurisdiction between them[.]”15  Alternatively, it may find “[t]here is a clear
and convincing need for a new determination of the issue . . . because it was
not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would
arise in the context of a subsequent action.”16  Finally, a court could find “the
party . . . to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other
special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to
obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.”17
Some commentators have noted inherent procedural differences and
consequently criticize preclusion by arbitration in subsequent litigation.18
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19. Supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
22. Act of July 30, 1947, c. 392, 61 Stat. 670, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
23. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924)).
24. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985) (compelling domestic arbitration
in SEC action).
25. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2004):
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies
thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or
copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal
exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken.
Pointing to language in case law which states that arbitration is binding
because it is a creature of contract, they suggest limiting the preclusive effects
of an arbitral award to only what the parties actually stipulate within their
contract.19  However, they acknowledge that the current state of the law is that
arbitration can be given preclusive effect.20
Historically, arbitration and adjudication have not enjoyed an easy
coexistence.  The United States Supreme Court explained, “English courts
traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as ‘ousting’ the
courts of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason.
This view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to
the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act.”21  “[R]eversing centuries of
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,” the Federal Arbitration Act of
194722 “was designed to allow parties to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of
litigation,’ and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts . . . .’”23
However, enforcing agreements to arbitrate and recognizing arbitral
awards do not necessitate that arbitral awards will be the final word.  Parties
may still have their day in court for claims which are outside the scope of the
agreement; they may even be permitted to relitigate certain issues which were
previously determined by the arbitral panel.  In a line of cases involving
agreements to submit to domestic arbitration, the Supreme Court has insisted
that “it is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any preclusive
effect on the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims.”24  The Full Faith and
Credit Clause25 does not apply to arbitration awards since domestic arbitration
936 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:931
26. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984) (citing Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982), and declining to grant collateral estoppel effect from an
arbitration, but suggesting its admission into evidence in the subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit).
27. Id. at 288.
28. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 222 (compelling domestic arbitration in SEC action).
The Court reiterated the basis for its holding in McDonald:
We also declined, in McDonald, to fashion a federal common-law rule of preclusion, in part on the
ground that arbitration cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting
the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard. We therefore
recognized that arbitration proceedings will not necessarily have a preclusive effect on subsequent
federal-court proceedings.
Id. at 223.
29. Id.
30. Id.
is not a judicial proceeding, an act of a state legislature, or a record of a state
court.26  Consequently, “[b]ecause federal courts are not required by statute
to give res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an unappealed arbitration
award, any rule of preclusion would necessarily be judicially fashioned.”27
Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly “declined . . . to fashion a federal
common-law rule of preclusion” regarding the effects of an unconfirmed
domestic arbitral award;28 instead, “[lower] courts may directly and effectively
protect federal interests by determining the preclusive effect to be given to an
arbitration proceeding.”29  They should therefore compel agreements to
arbitrate without fearing the awards will bar subsequent suits:
Significantly, . . . courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by
determining the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding.  Since
preclusion doctrine comfortably plays this role, it follows that neither a stay of the
arbitration proceedings, nor a refusal to compel arbitration of state claims, is required in
order to assure that a precedent arbitration does not impede a subsequent federal-court
action.  The Courts of Appeals that have assumed collateral-estoppel effect must be given
to arbitration proceedings have therefore sought to accomplish indirectly that which they
erroneously assumed they could not do directly.30
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, the issue of collateral estoppel was not
before the Court; nevertheless, it took the opportunity to reiterate the test it
had established in prior case law:
The question of what preclusive effect, if any, the arbitration proceedings might have is
not yet before us, however, and we do not decide it.  The collateral-estoppel effect of an
arbitration proceeding is at issue only after arbitration is completed . . . .  Suffice it to say
that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the federal
interests warranting protection.  As a result, there is no reason to require that district
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31. Id.
32. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 284; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
For a summary of Supreme Court opinions in this area, see Jane Byeff Korn, Changing Our Perspective
on Arbitration:  A Traditional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL L. REV. 67.
34. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), overruled by Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) and De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S.
477 (1989); compare Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (requiring the parties to submit to
arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (compelling international arbitration of antitrust claims).
See also RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 560-84 (2000)
(discussing enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, particularly in the international arena).
35. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627-28; see also supra note 34; cf. supra note 14.
36. E.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20; see also J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc.
v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 1988).
37. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG,
270 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2001).
38. See cases cited supra note 36.
courts decline to compel arbitration, or manipulate the ordering of the resulting
bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an infringement of federal interests.31
In the past,“substantial statutory rights” not subject to preclusion by domestic
arbitration included Title VII,32 the Fair Labor Standards Act,33 and formerly,
SEC actions.34  More recently, the Court has not only refused to expand this
list but has also stepped back from it, at least with respect to international
arbitration:  “[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited
the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”35
II.  THE U.N. CONVENTION ON ARBITRAL AWARDS:  WHY INTERNATIONAL
PARTIES TURN TO ARBITRATION TO RESOLVE COMM ERCIAL DISPUTES
In stark contrast to domestic arbitral awards, the Supreme Court has noted
strong policy reasons for deference to international commercial arbitration in
order to encourage global economics.36  The Court stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.37
However, the presumption favors enforcement of arbitration agreements and
recognition of arbitral awards, rather than preclusion per se.38
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39. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2000).
41. U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. I(i).
42. Id. at art. I(3).
43. Id. at art. II(1)-(2).
44. Id. at art. II(1).
45. Id. at art. II(3).
Generally, transnational commercial suits may be in federal court not only
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,39 but also under federal subject matter
jurisdiction which is conferred by 9 U.S.C. § 205 to actions that “relate[] to”
an arbitration agreement that falls under the Convention.40  Article I of the
Convention governs its applicability:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made
in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical
or legal.  It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.41
A contracting state may also require reciprocity or limit the scope of
applicability to “differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law
of the State making such declaration.”42
Under Article II of the Convention, “[e]ach Contracting State shall
recognize an agreement in writing,” which is defined as “an arbitral clause in
a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams,”43 wherein:
. . . the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.44
Either party may request that a court of a contracting state refer the parties to
arbitration rather than hearing the action, “unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”45
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that, subject to the
well-pleaded complaint rule, a suit consisting of only state law claims was
removable to federal court due to a remote arbitration clause where the
property in dispute was a Hungarian oil field:
[W]henever an arbitration agreement falling under the Convention could conceivably
affect the outcome of the plaintiff’s case, the agreement “relates to” the plaintiff’s suit.
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46. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2002).
47. U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. IV(1)-(2).
48. Id. at art. III.
49. Id. at art. VI.
50. Id.
51. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2000) and U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art.
V(1)-(2).  It should be noted that unlike foreign arbitral awards, other countries’ judgments are not covered
by federal statute, and consequently are not afforded the same level of deference in U.S. courts.  While the
Convention imposes mandatory recognition and enforcement procedures, comity is a discretionary policy
which affords respect to other countries’ judgments.  The landmark case, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895), sets out the general statement for analysis of enforceability of foreign judgments under
comity while denying enforcement of a French judgment due to lack of reciprocity with the United States.
In general, subsequent cases have not required reciprocity.  See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
Choice of law arguments also figure strongly in a court’s use of discretion in recognizing foreign
judgments.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1969); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481-483 (1986); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country
Judgments:  Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53 (1984).  The Informal Working Group of the Hague
Thus, the district court will have jurisdiction under [9 U.S.C.] § 205 over just about any
suit in which a defendant contends that an arbitration clause falling under the Convention
provides a defense.  As long as the defendant’s assertion is not completely absurd or
impossible, it is at least conceivable that the arbitration clause will impact the disposition
of the case.  That is all that is required to meet the low bar of “relates to.”46
After the arbitration has concluded, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement should supply the court of a contracting state with the original or
a copy of the agreement to arbitrate and a duly authenticated original or
certified copy of the award, both of which must be translated into an official
language of that court’s contracting state.47  Article III mandates that “[e]ach
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down [in the Convention]” and may not
“impos[e] substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges”
than it would for domestic arbitral awards.48  However, a party may apply “for
the setting aside or suspension of the award.”49  The court has the discretion
to order a stay “if it considers it proper [to] adjourn the decision on the
enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the party
claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable
security.”50
Given the primary purpose of encouraging and facilitating international
commercial arbitration, the applicable federal statute for enforcement and
recognition codifies the Convention’s limited grounds for refusal or
modification of an arbitral award.51  Some of the listed justifications are
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Judgments Project is currently drafting a proposal which would afford foreign judgments similar treatment
to the Arbitration Convention.  See Working Document No. 49 of the Special Commission Meeting on
Judgments of December 2003, at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/workdoc49e.pdf (last visited on Feb. 25, 2004).
52. U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a).
53. Id. at art. V(1)(b).
54. Id. at art. V(1)(d).
55. Id. at art. V(1)(e).
56. Id. at art. V(1)(c).
57. Id. at art. V(2).
procedural matters.  For example, the party against whom enforcement is
being invoked could prove that the parties to the agreement were “under some
incapacity” under the applicable law, or that the agreement to arbitrate was
“not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or . . . under the
law of the country where the award was made.”52  Refusal is also proper if the
party against whom enforcement is being sought “was not given proper notice
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case . . . .”53  The party may also contest the
improper composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure, if they
were “not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, . . . not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place.”54  Recognition and enforcement are not proper if “[t]he
award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law
of which, that award was made.”55  Parties may also invoke the scope
provision to remove any portion of an arbitral award that “deals with a
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or . . . decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration . . . .”56  Two other grounds permit refusal if the
subject matter of the dispute “is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of [the enforcing] country[,]” or if the court deems the award
“contrary to [its country’s] public policy . . . .”57
Thus under the Convention, res judicata is certain—a future action based
on the same claim is precluded if it has been decided in a foreign arbitration.
However, collateral estoppel is not necessarily mandated—an issue which has
already been determined in a prior arbitration could be relitigated if the new
action is based on a different claim.  Despite the Convention’s semi-automatic
provisions for enforcement, this article will show under the case law that its
codification does not translate into automatic issue preclusion in subsequent
litigation.
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58. Glictronix Corp. v. AT&T Co., 603 F. Supp. 552, 573 (D. N.J. 1994) (quoting Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962))
(addressing an administrative decision).
59. E.g., Gruntal & Co. v. Steinberg, 854 F. Supp. 324, 337 (D. N.J. 1994) (stating it is the judicial
confirmation, not the arbitral award, that can be given preclusive effect); Wurttembergishe Fire Ins. Co. v.
Republic Ins. Co., No. 86 Civ. 2696 (CSH), 1987 WL 19288 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1987) (denying collateral
estoppel where party dropped confirmation proceedings); cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461
(1982) (finding that an administrative decision warranted res judicata effect in federal court under full faith
and credit once it had been confirmed in state court).
An example of a successful defensive use of an arbitral award for collateral estoppel purposes,
Witkowski v. Welch involved a domestic award that had been confirmed in district court pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 13.  Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999).  The  Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated that once confirmed, an arbitral award should be given the same enforcement as any other
judgment from the rendering court.  Id. at 200.  The plaintiff, Witkowski, brought fraud and ERISA claims
against defendants Welch and Shreim.  Id. at 195.  These claims went to arbitration, where the fraud claims
were dismissed with prejudice and the ERISA claim was determined in plaintiff’s favor.  Id. at 195-97.  The
plaintiff then sought to relitigate the fraud claims in subsequent litigation, and the district court “confirmed
the arbitrator’s award in all respects,” then later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
collateral estoppel grounds.  Id. at 195.  The court of appeals upheld the district court’s summary judgment,
finding that once the arbitration award had been confirmed in district court, it was a final judgment on the
merits.  Id. at 200.  Also, the issues were the same in both actions, the party (appellant Witkowski) against
whom collateral estoppel was being asserted was a party (plaintiff) to the prior proceeding, and the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior arbitration.  Id.
60. Supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.  A related issue is whether the United States court
should recognize and enforce an arbitral award which has been annulled in a foreign country.  In
Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic, the court considered this issue of first impression and
confirmed and enforced the international commercial arbitral award despite its nullification by the Egyptian
Court of Appeals.  939 F. Supp. 907, 914-15 (D.D.C. 1996).  However, later cases have yielded the opposite
result.  See Baker Marine, Ltd. v. Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 196-98 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing
Chromalloy and refusing confirmation of Nigerian arbitral awards which had been nullified in Nigerian
III.  INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ANALYZED WITHIN
CASE LAW:  THE CONVENTION MILITATES A DIFFERENT APPROACH
A.  Final and Valid Judgment
In general, a federal court’s assessment of “[w]hether a judgment should
be considered final for the purposes of collateral estoppel ‘turns upon such
factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative),
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.’”58
Many cases stand for the rule that it is the judicial confirmation of the
arbitral award that affords preclusive effect, not the award itself.59  Similarly,
the U.N. Convention states that once an arbitral award has been confirmed or
finalized in a foreign court, it should be construed as a final judgment and is
worthy of recognition and enforcement by signatory countries unless one of
the few narrow exceptions laid out in Article V exists.60  However, there is a
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courts); Karaha Bodas Co. v. Negara, 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
61. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 207 (2000).
62. Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.
2002).
63. Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 85 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 86 (citation omitted) (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1993)).
65. Despite prior case law, most modern courts, including the Supreme Court, have said that
limit to the action a United States court can take:  The corresponding statute
confers federal subject matter jurisdiction, but does not provide an exception
to the required personal jurisdiction.61  Thus, only if the district court has
jurisdiction over the parties may the award be confirmed against them.62
In a recent Second Circuit case in which the court reviewed a district
court’s confirmation of an American Arbitration Association (AAA)
arbitration, federal subject matter jurisdiction was proper under the
Convention because it met the three jurisdiction requirements of 9 U.S.C.
§ 203:  “[T]he award (1) must arise out of a legal relationship (2) which is
commercial in nature and (3) which is not entirely domestic in scope.”63  The
court then explained the applicable review of confirmations:
In reviewing a district court’s confirmation of an arbitral award, we review legal issues
de novo and findings of fact for clear error.  Federal court review of an arbitral judgment
is highly deferential; such judgments are to be reversed only where the arbitrators have
exceeded their authority or made a finding in manifest disregard of the law.  “[A]s long
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision.”  “[C]ourts may vacate awards only for an overt
disregard of the law and not merely for an erroneous interpretation . . . .  Moreover, the
law ignored by the arbitrators must be well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable if the
award is to be vacated.”64
Even though appellate review under the Convention is highly deferential,
this deferential standard of review for recognition and enforcement does not
necessarily extend to a court’s subsequent independent inquiry into whether
the arbitration’s determination of a particular issue will be deemed final and
conclusive between the parties.  Furthermore, the right of appeal of the
confirmation proceeding may provide further due process safeguards.
B.  Identical Issue
The issue of fact or law sought to be precluded must be identical in both
proceedings.65  Despite the apparent simplicity of this requirement, it is
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collateral estoppel may apply to questions of law as well as issues of fact as a general matter.  E.g., Montana
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1979).  See Market St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp.,
No. 92 Civ. 7434 (LMM), 1993 WL 276062 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1993).  However, offensive use of collateral
estoppel would be “inappropriate where ‘[t]he issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule on which it was
based.’”  Glictronix Corp. v. AT&T Co., 603 F. Supp. 552, 571 (D. N.J. 1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27(7)) (addressing an administrative decision).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c.
67. Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations
omitted).
68. MOORE ET AL ., supra note 12, § 132.03[2][b].
69. Slavin v. Benson, 493 F. Supp. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
actually highly contestable.  The party opposing collateral estoppel can argue
that the issues, even though facially identical, are different because the first
dispute focused on different nuances in order to prove the other cause of
action, or because the identities of the parties make the issues different where
privity is claimed or nonmutual use of collateral estoppel is asserted.66  The
following example illustrates one court’s determination that this requirement
has been met by the foreign arbitration.  Stating, “[a]ll of the plaintiffs’ claims
raise but a single issue:  the right of the Norrises to participate in the
continued profits of Twining Tea’s United States distributorship.  That issue
has already been decided at the Norris-Cooper arbitration proceeding[,]” the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the issues were not identical:
We also find no merit in the Norrises’ argument that collateral estoppel should not apply
because the remedy sought in this action differs from the one obtained in the arbitration
proceeding.  As the district court found, the remedies sought in both proceedings were
identical.  Plaintiffs should not be given a second chance to litigate the same issue.  The
fact that plaintiffs base their claims on new legal theories does not shield them from the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, as liability is premised on the same issue in both
proceedings.67
Frequently, the lack of written findings or opinions explaining an arbitral
award makes it more difficult to determine whether the issue in the second suit
is actually identical to the first suit.  However, the absence of a written
opinion is not necessarily fatal, because “[i]n determining which issues have
been actually litigated, the federal court is free to go beyond the judgment and
may examine the pleadings and the evidence in the prior action.”68  In
addition, parties can submit parol evidence to show that the arbitrator reached
the issues sought to be precluded.69  At least one court has said it is even
permissible to make inferences, although any ambiguity must be resolved
against collateral estoppel:  “When the issue for which preclusion is sought is
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70. Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992); MOORE ET AL ., supra note
12, § 132.03[2][d].  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27.
71. Glictronix, 603 F. Supp. 552.  See also Norrell Health Care, Inc. v. Clayton, 168 B.R. 700
(Bankr. N.D. Ca. 1994) (examining the proceedings closely to determine whether the issue was necessary
to the decision, but declining to apply collateral estoppel preclusion partly out of concern for state law
differences and uncertainty of standard of proof applied).
72. E.g., Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating no preclusion of
securities fraud issue due to uncertain identity of issues and different standard of proof); Steelmet, Inc. v.
Caribe Towing Corp., 747 F.2d 689 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding arbitration had different burden of proof than
trial); Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1972) (landmark
case holding that the issues regarding quality of the cloth were not identical due to different liability and
causation); Osuala v. Cmty. Coll. of Phila., No. CIV. A. 00-98, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11609, at *14-*15
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2000) (stating that preclusive effect of arbitration is “permissible, but not mandatory,”
and denying it because the issue was not identical); Rep. of Phillippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 782
F. Supp. 972 (D. N.J. 1992) (holding issues were not identical in both actions because the tribunal applied
a higher standard of proof and the counts of conspiracy were broader in the second action; in addition,
privity was not satisfied); Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that sister companies were in privity but the different contracts made the issues not identical).
73. Supra note 72.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (listing factors that may
mitigate against preclusion, including the second forum affording additional procedural opportunities);
MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 131.32 (discussing how the “[n]ature of [the] prior tribunal may affect
claim preclusion”).
74. Comity is the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”  Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
the only rational one the fact finder could have found, then that issue is
considered foreclosed, even if no explicit finding of that issue has been
made.”70
The issue may not be deemed identical where there is a difference in the
forums in which the two actions are to be determined,71 or where the standard
of proof varies.72  Although collateral estoppel has been denied where the
party seeking preclusion based on a domestic arbitration was unable to show
that the standard of proof applied by an arbitrator was identical to that of the
state or federal forum,73 vast differences in various nations’ substantive law
and procedures could obliterate any possibility of an international arbitral
award’s preclusive effect if courts insisted on a complete identity between the
forums.  Thus, cases involving foreign arbitration should also factor in the
need for comity74 as well as Hilton v. Guyot’s oft-quoted standard governing
recognition of foreign judgments:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation
or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and
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75. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
76. Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1286 (2d Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 1285 (quoting 5 J. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ¶ 5011.27 (1985)).
78. E.g., Gruntal & Co. v. Steinberg, 854 F. Supp. 324 (D. N.J. 1994) (stating that arbitration
procedures do not always provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate, present witnesses, evidence, etc.),
aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); Glictronix Corp. v. AT&T Co., 603 F. Supp. 552 (D. N.J. 1994) (stating
Third Circuit rules for collateral estoppel, as well as fairness factors for offensive, nonmutual collateral
estoppel); accord, e.g., In re Selmonosky, 204 B.R. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (precluding some issues but not
all).  But see Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1985); Ivery v. United
States, 686 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (granting preclusion where procedures were adequate).  See generally
MOORE ET AL ., supra note 12, § 132.03.
those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in
the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be
tried afresh . . . .75
C.  Fully and Fairly Litigated
In order to be “fully and fairly litigated,” actual resolution of the issue
must have been necessary to the outcome of the award, but “the failure of the
arbitrator to render detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law does not
render the award ambiguous”:76
First, the issue dispositive of the present action must have been necessarily decided in the
prior action.  This does not mean that the prior decision must have been explicit.  “If by
necessary implication it is contained in that which has been explicitly decided, it will be
the basis for collateral estoppel.”77
Due process demands that any party to be precluded must have had a full
and fair opportunity to air the relevant evidence; arbitration proceedings as a
whole are most likely to be attacked on the basis of this element.  Parties
usually elect in their contracts which rules of arbitration will be applied.  For
example, domestic arbitration agreements commonly select the American
Arbitration Association, whose procedures may be inadequate to bar
subsequent litigation; in the past, courts have declined preclusive effect where
the tribunal did not provide for a final written opinion or findings, extensive
discovery, authority to subpoena witnesses, cross examination of witnesses,
lawyers representing the parties, or a final right of appeal.78  Courts have also
denied preclusivity in cases in which the arbitrator was a shop expert rather
than a lawyer or judge, the findings exceeded the scope of arbitrator’s
authority, the forum was inconvenient, or the stakes were lower in the first
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79. Supra note 78.
80. See BRAND, supra note 34, at 585-86; see also Daniel M. Kolkey, It’s Time to Adopt the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3 (1998) (comparing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Model and United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model).
81. See discussion infra Parts II and III(1) and accompanying footnotes.
82. See U.N. Convention on Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. II, see also discussion infra Parts
I, II and notes 18-19.
83. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the Day in Court Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1992) (footnote omitted).
84. For the complete list of such relationships, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27,
43-61; 18 CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4457 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the relationships with reference to specific cases applying
virtual representation); see also Moldovan v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 790 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding trustee was not adequately represented by union); Johnson v. United Food & Commercial Workers,
828 F.2d 961, 966 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding union fairly represented the workers); Collins v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 34 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding worker was not represented by other employees);
action so that there was less incentive to litigate.79  In contrast, foreign
arbitration panels often follow procedures such as the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) rules or the UNCITRAL model for international
arbitration,80 which are much more like adjudication.  Moreover, the
Convention’s list of mandatory and discretionary factors are meant to curtail
any judicial bias against international commercial arbitration.81
D.  Privity
Especially in the arbitration context, it may be appropriate to narrowly
construe privity.  The original parties are bound to arbitration of their disputes
because they affirmatively agree to it in their contracts;82 however, the original
parties’ privies do not expressly make such a waiver of judicial remedy.
The day in court ideal pulls so strongly against preclusion that a person who was not a
party to the first suit frequently may relitigate legal and factual issues that have already
been determined in that suit.  It often makes no difference that the nonparty sues about
the same set of events, asserts the same legal theories, seeks the same remedies, or shares
the same interests in the outcome of the litigation as the plaintiff to the first suit.  Nor
does it matter that the nonparty and the original plaintiff retain the same attorney or that
the nonparty testified at the original trial.  Even when the nonparty declines an
opportunity to intervene and participate in the first suit, preclusion is rarely allowed.83
In order to comport with due process, the party to be estopped must have
been fully represented in the prior proceeding, either directly (as the movant’s
previous adversary) or virtually (through a relationship such that his or her
interests have been represented by the losing party).84  One commonly
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Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (D. N.J. 2001) (“holding that [a]ny privity analysis must
center on a finding of identity of interests between the parties in the first and second cases[]”), aff’d, 534
U.S. 1110 (2002).  See generally Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1949) (establishing privity
principles for preclusion).
85. See Bone, supra note 83.
86. Supra note 90; cf. Bone, supra note 83, at 236, 280 (finding no personal right to appear in court
and advocating instead a case-by-case analysis of the legitimacy of the absent party’s claim); Thomas J.
Stipanovich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute:  The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV.
473, 500-02 (1987) (advocating consolidation in arbitration context).
87. See supra note 84.  A good case for illustration is Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287
(3d Cir. 1996).  Even though the subsidiaries were not allowed to force the dispute to arbitration since their
contract did not include it, the court stayed action pending arbitration.  Id. at 1303.  Presumably, the
arbitration would have some preclusive or evidentiary effect in subsequent proceedings.  Similarly, in
Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), the court stayed the remaining
claims and motions pending outcome of the arbitration because the arbitration would likely determine most
of the issues, and in Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela,
991 F.2d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1993), the court stayed judicial proceedings pending arbitration.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 43-44, 49-61.
89. Usina Costa Pinto S.A. Acucar E Alcool v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Co., 933 F. Supp. 1170
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
recurring notion is that the actors are in privity if the second party could be
sought for enforcement of the monetary award entered against the original
party.85  Similarly, privity can be met if the second party directed the
arbitration proceedings from behind the scenes, including making legal
decisions and financing the original party’s legal team.86  The factors which
support compulsory arbitration and consolidation are also those that support
privity.87  Again, the idea is that the second party is bound to the decision
through its relationship with the original party.
International commercial transactions frequently involve business and
property relationships which may give rise to a finding of privity:  certain
positions within a corporation, members of a partnership, and unincorporated
associations; joint and several liability, co-obligors and joint obligees;
vicarious liability arising from master/servant, principal/agent, and
insurer/insured relationships; concurrent and successive property; transfers
and co-owners of property and business arrangements such as assignation,
promisee and intended beneficiary of a contract, and indemnification.88
Privity may be most often at issue in international commercial dispute
resolution where the parties are parent/subsidiaries or brother/sister
corporations, or agents of a party to the arbitration.  For example, in Usina
Costa Pinto S.A. Acucar E Alcool v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Co., the plaintiff
sugar mill brought fraud and related claims against two defendant sugar
companies.89  Despite the fact that the plaintiff had been unaware of the
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90. Id. at 1178.
91. Id. at 1179.  See also E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin
Intermediates S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing the privity requirement of collateral estoppel
and describing other related doctrines, including equitable estoppel).
92. Hugo Marom Aviation Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical, Inc., No. 87 C 9273, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6877 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1991) and Hugo Marom Aviation Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical Inc.,
No. 87 C 9273, 1992 WL 233942 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1992).
93. Hugo Marom, 1991 LEXIS 6877 at *8, *17-*18.
94. Id. at *12-*13.
defendants’ interrelationship and potential conspiracy until the arbitration was
nearly complete, the court did not permit collateral estoppel against the second
defendant because it was not a party in the original arbitration proceedings
and thus had not defended itself against the claim.90  The narrowness of the
court’s privity analysis may be distinguishable here because the movant
sought to preclude conspiracy as well as fraud issues, which directly impacted
the due process rights of the second defendant, yet the court did compel
further arbitration due to the close relationship of the parties.91
IV.  THE HUGO MAROM  EXAMPLE :  INTEGRATING THE CONVENTION INTO
THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ANAL YSIS
The unpublished district court proceedings of Hugo Marom Aviation
Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical, Inc.92 illustrate a careful and insightful
implementation of the Convention in matters of jurisdiction, recognition, and
enforcement, to ultimately permit collateral estoppel of issues which had been
determined in arbitration in Israel.  In the first proceeding, the foreign arbitral
award had not yet been confirmed in the Israeli court, so the Illinois district
judge held that it had no preclusive effect on the corporation’s counterclaims
for wrongful conversion, breach of contract, and fraud.93  The court pointed
to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201, and said:
It seems clear that if federal law is to apply, [then] this is the federal law most directly on
point.  Although the Convention might seem to be directed more to actions to enforce
foreign arbitration awards, its provisions deal directly with the issues presently before
this court, i.e., the determination of whether or not the arbitration award is final and the
effect that such a foreign arbitration award ought to be given in a federal court of the
United States.94
The court went on to explain that 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-03 confer original
jurisdiction on the district court, regardless of the amount in controversy, if
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95. Id. at *13-*14.
96. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1958)).
97. Id. at *15-*18.
98. Id. at *19 (citing Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 316 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir. 1963) (granting res
judicata for steelworkers union arbitration)).
99. Id. at *25-*30.
100. Hugo Marom Aviation Consultants, Ltd. v. Recon/Optical, Inc., No. 87 C 9273, 1992 WL
233942, at *4-*5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1992).
101. Id. at *6.  See also Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1986)
(upholding summary judgment on basis of collateral estoppel where all claims were resolved in prior
arbitration); accord Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (also discussing foreign
policy arguments).
the action arises out of a legal relationship which is considered
“commercial.”95  However, if the relationship is entirely between citizens of
the United States, it falls under the Convention only if it “involves property
abroad, ‘envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.’”96  The court then looked
to the Israel Arbitration Law to determine if the award was considered final
there; when it discovered it was not, the court found that it was not bound by
the award, nor was it res judicata as to the parties.97  The court acknowledged
that other jurisdictions have given unconfirmed arbitration awards preclusive
effect.98  The Marom court went on to discuss a corporate alter-ego theory
involving the three parties, listed the elements for claim and issue preclusion,
and found that the Israeli appeal scheduled for later that year would determine
which issues were actually determined and essential to the judgment.99
In the subsequent opinion, the same court held that the defendant’s
counterclaims were collaterally estopped since the common issues from the
arbitration had been confirmed in Tel Aviv district court under Israeli law.100
Denying the defendant’s arguments that 1) the award was not yet final because
confirmation of other counts was still pending, and 2) the arbitrator failed to
apply a clear legal standard, the court said it would not second guess the
Israeli district court’s determination.101
CONCLUSION
When rightfully applied, preclusion rules balance the need to keep the
courthouse doors open for disputes the litigants did not contract to arbitrate
with the need to narrow the issues in dispute, lessen trial lengths, and provide
rightful repose for the parties.  A judge who is most familiar with an older
AAA model of arbitration may be particularly uncomfortable with allowing
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arbitral awards to preclude the subsequent judicial proceeding, pointing to the
lack of discovery, less formal evidence rules, and compromise verdicts as the
norm.  Indeed, it may appear that because preclusion rules were fashioned
within a judicial framework, they may not be elastic enough to stretch for
alternative dispute resolution’s processes.  Yet at least where international
commercial arbitral awards are concerned, the Convention mandates a broader
acceptance of these decisions and their ultimate effect.
As the preceding analysis of case law has demonstrated, recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Convention does not
automatically result in issue preclusion in subsequent litigation.  To reconcile
the matter, courts must continue to require all of the traditional elements of
collateral estoppel, yet also comport with the Convention and at least respect,
if not further, the purposes for which it was entered into:  to increase
international trade and provide for predictable resolution of legal matters
between parties of disparate legal systems in a global economy.  First, courts
should carefully analyze the issues to determine if they are identical.  Second,
only parties or their privies should be held to the benefit of their bargain.
Next, courts should apply the Convention to determine third, whether such
issues were fully and fairly litigated in the prior proceedings and finally, to
determine whether the arbitration resulted in a final and valid judgment.  This
integrated approach of using the U.N. Convention within the traditional
collateral estoppel framework would ensure the arbitration’s preclusive effect
when it is indeed warranted.
